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The Direction of Causality  
Between Blockholder Ownership and Firm Value: 
 US and EU Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the causal relationship between blockholder ownership (measured by the 
fraction of shares controlled by large shareholders) and firm value (measured as the simple 
Tobin's Q) of the largest EU and US companies. Using Granger causality tests we find no 
significant causal effects either way in the US/UK, but in continental Europe we find a 
negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm value and a negative effect of firm value on 
blockholder ownership. Consistent with an overall non-linear relationship, as hypothesised by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Stultz (1988), the negative effect of blockholder 
ownership on firm value performance is found to be significant only for companies with high 
initial levels of blockholder ownership (> 10%), but insignificant for companies with low 
initial levels. Consistent with lower protection of minority investors and larger private 
benefits of control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) the causal relationships are only significant in 
continental Europe, even for high initial levels of blockholder ownership.  
 
JEL classifications: G32, L20 
 
Keywords: Blockholder ownership, firm value, Granger causality, system effects, and panel 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance and ownership have clearly become important topics in management 
as well as finance, economics and law.  A key issue of concern is whether large owners 
(blockholders) can contribute to the solution of agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Although an enormous number of papers have analysed the impact of blockholder ownership 
or ownership concentration on firm value and other performance measures (Short, 1994), it 
has not been firmly established whether the presence of large owners does in fact improve 
company performance (Holderness, 2001). Historically, empirical research has examined the 
impact of ownership structure on firm value in simple regression models (e.g., Short 1994). 
But more recently a second generation of research (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999) has built on a point raised by Harold Demsetz (1983), 
namely that ownership is an endogenous variable and that this must be taken into account in 
empirical estimation. Using simultaneous equation models the second-generation papers have 
concluded that the impact of ownership on performance is insignificant. This finding 
confirms the supposition voiced by Demsetz (1983): there should be no impact in equilibrium 
since this would imply that owners/investors would profit by reshuffling their portfolios. In 
particular, one might expect a significant reverse feedback from firm value to ownership 
structure as owners react to good or bad performance by buying or selling shares. 
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Despite the fact that previous studies have attempted to infer causality from cross-sectional 
data sets, causality is more readily understood as a process in time (cause preceding effect). 
This paper contributes to the ongoing research in this field by applying Granger causality 
tests (Granger, 1969) to examine the causal relationship between blockholder ownership and 
firm value.  We analyse time series data on ownership  (the fraction of shares that are 
“closely held”) and firm value (the simple Tobin's Q ratio) over a 10-year period (1988-1998) 
for 876 of the largest EU and US companies. The inclusion of EU companies is important 
since extensive empirical research has documented that ownership structure as well as its 
determinants and effects may differ across countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, Pedersen 
and Thomsen, 1997, 2000).  We find that system differences do matter. In the US/UK there is 
no evidence of causality either way, that is neither from firm value to ownership nor from 
ownership to firm value. However, in continental Europe we find evidence of fairly strong 
negative effects going both ways: a negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm value, 
and a negative effect of firm value on blockholder ownership. Since these effects are 
significant only for firms with high initial levels of blockholder ownership, this evidence may 
be interpreted as an indication that the high level of blockholder ownership in continental 
Europe has reduced firm value, at least from the viewpoint of minority investors. 
 
 
2. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
We define blockholders as large owners who own at least 5% of a company’s shares 
(typically more). We assume that such large owners are likely to be consulted on strategic 
issues (Holderness, 2001) and thereby influence the company’s stock market performance. 
We are interested in examining, how stock market performance is affected.  
 
A number of empirical studies have supported the assumption that blockholder ownership 
does influence corporate management. For example, blockholders have been found to affect 
executive compensation (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Mehran, 1995), executive turnover 
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(Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1997) corporate diversification and asset restructuring (Hoskisson. 
Johnson and Moesl, 1994; Denis & Sarin, 1999).  Nevertheless, the impact on corporate value 
is disputed. 
 
Although there is a presumption in the literature that large shareholders have greater power 
and stronger incentives to ensure shareholder value maximization (the incentive alignment 
hypothesis proposed by Zeckhouser and Pound, 1990), the theoretical relationship between 
large owners and company value is ambiguous. Blockholders may enjoy private benefits of 
control at the expense of small shareholders (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Mikkelson and 
Regassa, 1991). Blockholder ownership above a certain level may lead to entrenchment of 
managers and majority shareholders who can expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  The 
owners' portfolio risk will increase with the ownership share, which may influence risk taking 
and expected returns (although Wright, Ferris, Sarin and Awasti (1996) find that it does not).  
 
There may also be both positive and negative feedback effects from firm value to blockholder 
ownership.  Blockholders may reduce their shares in a particular firm when share prices are 
high relative to expectations (Zeckhouser and Pound, 1990). Companies seem more likely to 
issue stock on the market and thereby reduce the level of blockholder ownership when share 
prices are high.  With diffuse ownership, low share prices could invite outside raiders and 
others to acquire large stakes to replace the incumbent managers. On the one hand, these 
factors point to a negative effect of firm value on blockholder ownership. If blockholders 
have a strong preference to remain in control, on the other hand, higher market value makes it 
possible to finance a given level of investment by selling a smaller amount of stock to 
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outsider owners (La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000) and thereby to minimize the 
residual loss resulting from agency problems. This scenario implies a positive feedback effect 
of firm value on blockholder ownership. A pecking-order hypothesis would point in the same 
direction  (Myers and Majluf, 1984).   
 
Empirically,  the relationship is also uncertain. Suppose that there is a privately optimal level 
of insider ownership, which involves a trade-off between risk and incentive efficiency 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  Presumably, this optimal ownership share will differ from company to company 
because companies differ in terms of specific risk and the complexity of their activities 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).  Essentially, this means that the relationship between ownership 
structure and market value will vary across companies and industries as a function of 
company size, firm-specific uncertainty, risk and other factors that need to be verified 
empirically. This firm heterogeneity has been strongly emphasized by Himmelberg, Hubbard 
and Palia (1999). If owners have already adopted an optimal (shareholder value maximising) 
ownership structure, little can be learned from empirical studies that correlate ownership 
structure with firm value.  
 
Empirical studies also have not uncovered robust findings. While earlier studies tended to 
find a weak positive association between owner control and accounting profitability (Berle 
and Means 1932, Cubin and Leech 1983, Short 1994), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found no 
significant effect of ownership concentration on accounting profitability when controlling for 
determinants of ownership structure, and subsequent studies on international data have 
confirmed their findings (Bergstrøm and Rydkvist, 1990; Gerson and Barr, 1996; Pedersen 
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and Thomsen, 1999).   Likewise, studies of the impact of large owners on firm value at first 
found significant positive (conditional and non-linear) effects (Lloyd, Hand and Modani, 
1987; Zeckhouser and Pound, 1990; Oswald and Jahera, 1991; Li and Simerly, 1998; Morck 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000).  
But more recently, a second generation of research (Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999, Demsetz and Villalonga 2001) has disputed the 
relevance of these findings and reported insignificant performance effects in simultaneous 
estimations of causes and effects of director ownership.  
 
Loderer and Martin (1997) examine both Tobin’s Q-values and abnormal stock returns to 867 
acquisitions made by companies listed in the US from 1978-1988. They find a weak concave 
effect of director ownership on both performance measures when estimated by simple 
regression. However, the effect becomes insignificant when a simultaneous two-equation 
model is estimated that includes firm size and earnings volatility as determinants of director 
ownership. Abnormal acquisition returns are found to have a significant positive effect on 
director ownership, whereas Q-values are found to have a significant negative effect. The 
authors interpret these results as evidence that managers have inside knowledge and increase 
their shareholdings prior to good acquisitions while high share prices and Q-values induce 
them to sell out.  
 
Cho (1998) examines investment as an intermediate variable between director ownership and 
performance measured by Q-values. On a sample of 326 Fortune 500 firms in 1991, he finds 
that Q-values have a positive impact on director ownership and that director ownership has a 
significant non-monotonous effect on investment, which again has a positive impact on Q-
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values. When taking these factors into account in a three-equation model simultaneously 
determining director ownership, Q-values and investment, the non-monotonous effect of 
ownership structure on Q-values becomes insignificant. 
 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) use a panel of 300 Compustat firms over the period 
1982-1992 to control for fixed firm effects as an indicator of unobserved firm heterogeneity 
that influences both ownership structure and Q-values. They find a significant impact of 
director ownership on Q-values even after controlling for some observable determinants of 
ownership structure, but the impact becomes insignificant when the fixed firm effects are 
taken into account.  
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examine 223 US firms over the period 1976-1980, a sub-
sample of the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) data. They distinguish between two dimensions of 
ownership structure, managerial ownership and ownership concentration among outside 
shareholders.  Controlling for capital structure, capital intensity, advertising and research 
intensity, firm size, profit volatility, stock market risk and industry dummies for financial 
sector, media and utilities they find no significant effects of ownership structure on firm 
performance (Tobin’s Q).  In contrast, they find a significant negative effect of Q on both 
outside ownership concentration and managerial shareholdings. 
 
In summary, empirical research has tended to find a positive direct effect of blockholder 
ownership or similar measures such as director ownership, ownership concentration, or 
owner-control dummies. However, the effect appears to be insignificant when attempts are 
made to control for the determinants of ownership structure (when ownership is treated as an 
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endogenous variable). Simple regression estimates are defensible if ownership structures are 
sufficiently stable to be regarded as exogenous, but ownership structures do appear to change 
over time, partly in response to past performance (Denis and Sarin, 1999). Moreover, the 
significance of firm heterogeneity (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999) makes it difficult 
to sort out causal relationships on cross-sectional data even with simultaneous equation 
models.  
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
While previous studies have relied mainly on cross-section data, this paper applies a time 
series analysis to test whether changes in blockholder ownership are followed by changes in 
firm value and vice versa. We apply a Granger (1969) test to explore the causal relationship 
between blockholder ownership (OS) and firm value (Q). One standard requirement for 
causality is that changes in the cause variable should precede changes in the effect variable, 
and Granger causality analysis essentially tests for this condition. To apply a Granger 
causality test for causality we consider the information sets It, t=1,…, 10 with It = 
{(Qτ,OSτ)}τ<t,  Qt  and OSt  denoting the performance and the ownership at time t, 
respectively. Restricting attention to linear prediction with squared error loss we consider the 
models 
(1)  Qt   =  α1 + β1 OSt-1 +  β2 Qt-1 +  µ1t 
(2)  OSt =  α2 + β3 OSt-1 + β4 Qt-1 +  µ2t 
The α´s and β´s are parameters of the models, and µ1t and µ2t are uncorrelated error 
processes.  In these models if β1 ≠ 0, β4 = 0 we infer unidirectional OS to Q. In this case, 
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including OS as a predictor for Q will decrease the prediction error (or increase explained 
variance). Similarly, if β1 = 0, β4 ≠ 0, we infer unidirectional causality from Q to OS. If β1 ≠ 
0, β4 ≠ 0 we infer bi-directional causality between Q and OS.  To implement the tests we 
assume normality of errors, homogeneity of variance, condition on the first observation 
(Q1,OS1) and use OLS. β4 is significant and β1 is not.  
 
One of the advantages of this approach is that a number of structural factors that influence 
both present and lagged values of Q and OS are controlled for by including the lagged value 
as an explanatory variable. However, both changes in ownership and firm value may be 
accompanied by changes in other variables. To filter out effects that are not attributable to Q 
and OS respectively, we have reported results that also include firm and time effects (i.e., the 
panel data analysis allows for random firm and time effects) as well as some relevant control 
variables. Since structural variables like industry, risk and uncertainty are constant over time, 
they are captured by the lagged response variables and should therefore not be included in 
Granger causality tests. Variables that affect trend changes in ownership and performance are 
captured by the time and firm dummies. Nonetheless some determinants of corporate 
ownership and performance, such as capital structure, capital intensity and firm size, may 
change over time and are included as control variables. 
 
Although the effects of changes in blockholder ownership are theoretically uncertain, we 
propose the standard incentive alignment hypothesis for empirical testing. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Hypothesis 1.  Blockholder ownership positively Granger-causes firm value (the incentive 
alignment hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In other words, we propose to test whether a higher level of blockholder ownership causes 
share prices to increase. 
  
Several previous studies have found non-linear relationships between managerial ownership 
and firm value (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Thomsen and 
Pedersen, 2000). We recognise that the effects of changing blockholder ownership could 
depend on the initial level of concentration. At low levels of concentration, increasing 
ownership may imply increased monitoring, better incentive alignment, and a higher share 
price, whereas negative effects of increased entrenchment may be more important at high 
levels of blockholder ownership. We choose to explore these ideas by proposing the 
following hypothesis. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 2. For high levels of blockholder ownership the effect is reversed: blockholder 
ownership negatively Granger-causes firm value (non-linear effects hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
The relationship between blockholder ownership and firm value may also be contingent on 
system effects. In a series of influential papers La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1999, 
2000) have argued that national legal systems differ with regard to investor protection, and 
 
 12 
that this factor has implications for blockholder ownership and firm value. Others have 
emphasised the importance of complementary institutions (Roe, 1991, 1994; Pedersen and 
Thomsen, 1997). The legal systems approach advocated by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) seems 
to imply that blockholder ownership curbs agency problems in civil law countries that 
provide less investor protection through the legal system. However, the high levels of 
blockholder ownership come at a price: large owners expropriate wealth from minority 
investors, because of managerial entrenchment, privileged access to inside information and 
increased risk aversion compared to diversified minority investors. In civil law countries, the 
net effect of changes in ownership is therefore unclear; increasing blockholder ownership 
may imply reduced agency problems and higher firm value, but also greater risk of 
expropriation of minority investors, a factor that should tend to lower market values. In 
contrast, if minority investors are better protected in common law countries, the positive 
effects of increasing blockholder ownership might be more pronounced - at least for 
equivalent initial levels. These considerations lead to Hypothesis 3. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 3. Increases in blockholder ownership more likely Granger-cause firm value in 
economic systems that protect minority investors better (system effects hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
As mentioned, there are also conflicting opinions regarding the reverse effect of market value 
on blockholder ownership. Depending on the supply curve for individual stocks (Zeckhouser 
and Pound, 1990), individual blockholders may be more tempted to sell some of their shares 
in a particular firm when share prices are high. One good reason is that the absolute risk of 
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owning a given ownership stake increases with its value. A negative effect of firm size on 
ownership concentration was proposed and supported by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
numerous subsequent studies. Furthermore, companies seem more likely to issue stock to the 
market and thereby reduce the level of blockholder ownership when share prices are high.  
Finally, when caused by inefficient management a decreasing share price should in theory 
invite raiders and controlling shareholders to increase their holdings to repair the problem. 
These factors point to a negative effect of firm value on blockholder ownership.  
 
Positive feedback is also conceivable. Higher market value makes it possible to finance a 
given level of investment with a smaller amount of stock to outsider owners (La Porta, 
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000). If the blockholders want to keep as large an ownership 
stake as possible to align incentives  (La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000) or to 
avoid issuing too much new equity (Myers and Majluf 1984), this situation implies a positive 
effect of firm value on blockholder ownership. Since the effect of firm value on blockholder 
ownership is disputed, we suggest the following hypothesis for empirical testing. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Hypothesis 4.  Firm value positively Granger-causes blockholder ownership (control 
preference hypothesis). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
4.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
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 A description of the variables used is found in Table 1. The database is drawn from the 
Worldscope electronic database (Worldscope/Disclosure, annually) and consists of all EU 
and US companies that had net sales and net assets exceeding US$ 2 billion in 1998 and for 
which a annual time series was available over the 1990-1998 period. The data set contains 
876 companies with nine years of observation, giving a total of 7884 firm-year observations. 
 
Firm value is measured by dividing the sum of the market value of equity and the book value 
of the total debt by the book value of assets. The Tobin’s Q measure of equity at replacement 
costs was not available, so we use an approximation denoted (the “simple Q”) by Loderer and 
Martin (1997). However, Chung and Pruitt (1994) found that the correlation between the 
“simple Q” and a measure of Q that attempts to use market values throughout is as high as 
0.97. To correct for a right-skewed distribution of the firm value variable, we use log values. 
 
Blockholder ownership is measured by the fraction of closely held shares 
(Worldscope/Disclosure, 1997) including shares held by owners who hold more than 5%; 
shares held by officers, directors and their families, shares held in trust, shares held by 
another corporation (except in a fiduciary duty by banks) or shares held by pension/benefit 
plans. This measure is somewhat broader than the measures of blockholder ownership used in 
previous studies since it involves the holdings of insiders (managers) as well as large outside 
investors. We reason that the measurement error is small if managerial ownership is less than 
5%, and, if it is greater than that, managers should really be counted as blockholders. The 
main benefit of the measure is that it is available as a time series in the Worldscope database 
making up to nine consecutive years of observation for a large sample of US and European 
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companies (n=876) available. Previous research has found a high correlation between closely 
held shares and another concentration measure, namely the share of the largest owner 
(Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Since this measure is bounded between zero and 100, we use 
a logit transformation (see Table 1) to make the measure fit a normal distribution. 
 
To test for non-linear effects we split the data in two sub-samples: high and low initial 
blockholder ownership. The median of the level of blockholder ownership in 1990 (the first 
year of our data window) is 9.8 per cent (mean 6.6 per cent). We therefore split the sample 
into two groups: low blockholder ownership (<10 per cent) and high blockholder ownership 
(> 10 percent). Furthermore, to test for differences in legal system (and the level of investor 
protection) we follow La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny  (1998) and distinguish between 
companies based in common law countries (US and UK) and civil law countries (continental 
Europe). 
 
Control variables. While the Granger procedure and our use of random time and firm effects 
filter out the firm-specific heterogeneity that may influence both blockholder ownership and 
firm value, we have also included some control variables in order to control for possible 
changes in other determinants of ownership and performance, in addition to the structural 
factors captured by the lagged dependent variables and the fixed effects. Our control 
variables are similar to those adopted by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), excluding 
advertising and research intensity measures (which we did not have access to) and structural 
variables like risk, profit volatility and industry effects that supposedly do not change over 
time and therefore cancel out in year-to-year changes.  Sales change is intended to catch large 
changes in strategy and structure such as mergers and acquisitions that could be associated 
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with dilution of blockholder stakes. The strong negative association between firm size and 
ownership concentration (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) could indicate a negative effect of 
changes in firm size on ownership concentration. Higher sales growth could also have a 
positive influence on firm value. Sales/Asset change (change in asset turnover) is expected to 
control for changes in capital intensity that could also influence the need for external finance 
and thereby influence corporate ownership structure. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia  (1999) 
use fixed capital intensity as an indicator of low monitoring costs. A high sales/assets ratio 
may indicate high monitoring costs and perhaps a need to concentrate ownership. Asset 
turnover changes could also affect Q since higher turnover for a given assets will often mean 
higher accounting profitability.   Equity/assets ratio change captures changes in capital 
structure, which may put more pressure on managers to maximize profits to meet debt 
payments (Jensen, 1986, 1989) and thereby increase firm value. Likewise, capital structure 
could also be associated with ownership structure. Stultz (1988) indicates that high inside 
ownership may increase leverage because owners with a control preference increase their 
voting control per dollar of equity by issuing debt. If external circumstances allow them to 
borrow more or force them to borrow less, this development could then also affect their 
ownership structure.  
  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
Table 2 provides a correlation matrix and some descriptive statistics. 
 
// Insert Table 2 about here // 
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As might be expected, both Q-values and blockholder ownership (OS) are highly correlated 
with their lagged values: the correlation coefficients are well into the nineties. Blockholder 
ownership is negatively correlated with both present and lagged values of Q. Q-values are 
also negatively correlated with both present and lagged values of blockholder ownership. As 
a direct Granger test we first estimated the simple model, with common slopes and intercepts 
for all firms:  
 
3.  Qit   =  α1 + β1 OSit +  β2 Qi(t-1) +  µ1,it 
4.  OSit =  α2 + β3 OSi(t-1) + β4 Qi(t-1) +  µ2,it 
 
the error terms µj,it being independent with variances σj2 (j =1,2; t =1990, 1991…1998; i 
=1,2...876 firms). 
 
Since Q is measured at the end of the year, we assume that changes in blockholder ownership 
from t-1 to t are reflected in Q-values at time t. In contrast, Q is expected only to have an 
effect on blockholder ownership in the next period. The number of lags included reflects 
statistical significance: all variables lagging more than one period were found to be highly 
insignificant so we only report models with one lag. 
 
Table 3 reports some statistical results. 
 
// Insert Table 3 about here // 
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Model I is estimated as an OLS regression model using the SAS procedure GLM (SAS 
1999).  No control variables are included. 
 
The first column reports that firm value (Q) at time t-1 has a significant negative effect of  
–0.073 on blockholder ownership share (OS) when controlling for the past values of 
blockholder ownership. The second column reports that ownership share at time t-1 has a 
negative effect on firm value (Q) when controlling for the past value of firm value at time t-1. 
Both models are highly significant with very high F-values. As predicted,  blockholder 
ownership is found to Granger-cause market value since lagged values of blockholder 
ownership have a significant effect on Q-values. However, the effect is significantly negative 
and not positive as hypothesised. In other words, Hypothesis 1 is rejected. Secondly, market 
value is found to Granger-cause blockholder ownership since lagged Q-values have a 
significant, negative effect on OS, which contradicts Hypothesis 4. In other words, both 
Hypotheses 1 and 4 are rejected. 
   
In Model II we include some control variables, which are intended to capture the influence of 
unobserved third variables that might influence both blockholder ownership share and firm 
value. For example, increases in firm size/absolute risk and an increasing demand for capital 
(proxies: sales growth and an increasing sales/assets ratio) or insufficient equity (proxy: 
equity/assets) might induce the controlling coalition of blockholders to issue new equity and 
reduce their ownership share. However, neither of these control variables turns out to be 
significant. In contrast, a stock market premium seems to be associated with sell-offs 
(reductions in size), asset reductions (possibly as a result of outsourcing) and (contrary to a 
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standard agency theory hypotheses) with a more solid equity base. The Granger causality is 
not affected at all.  
 
In Model III we enlarge Model I by allowing for random time and firm effects, i.e., we 
estimated the models: 
 
5.  Qit   =  α1 + β1 OSit +  β2 Qi(t-1) + λi + νt + µ´1,it 
6.  OSit =  α2 + β3 OSi(t-1) + β4 Qi(t-1) + φi + γt +  µ´2,it 
 
where the random firm effects in each equation, λi and φi, are independent with the variances 
σ2Q, Firms and σ2OS, Firms, respectively, and means zero. Similarly, the random time effects 
within each equation, νt and γt, are independent with variances σ2Q, Time and σ2OS, Time and 
means zero. The errors, µ´1,it and µ´2,it, are still independent with variances σ2j and means 
zero. Furthermore, the random firm effects, random time effects, and the errors are assumed 
to be independent.  
 
The enlargement of the model, in Equations 5 and 6, thus lies in the error structure. In this 
model the random firm effects (that one can think of as random intercepts) correct for 
correlation between observations for a given firm (over the observed nine years) while the 
random time effects correct for correlation between observations at the same point in time. 
The random effects reflect the influence of unobserved variables characteristic for the 
individual firms (e.g. changes in strategy like mergers or sell-offs) and the points in time 
(e.g., fluctuations of the market).  
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The SAS Procedure TSCSREG (Time Series Cross Section Regression) with a variance 
component model that uses the Fuller-Battese method in the estimation (SAS 1999) is applied 
in order to estimate the model. The results of the estimation of the enlarged model with 
random time and firm effects are shown in Table 3, Model III. A Hausman test is conducted 
in order to test whether adding the random effects improves the models, and for both models 
the Hausman test turns out to be highly significant. This result indicates that the model with 
random firm and time effects gives a better fit of the data than a model without random 
effects. The split of the variance components shows that the significance of including the 
random effects is mainly a consequence of the firm effects that are substantially larger than 
the time effects. 
 
Again, as in Model I, lagged values of Q are found to exert a negative and significant 
influence on blockholder ownership, and blockholder ownership is found to have a negative 
and significant influence on Q-values. Once again, Hypotheses 1 and 4 are rejected.  
 
Model IV includes control variables (as in Model II) in addition to the random time and firm 
effects. Again, the results are qualitatively unchanged. Blockholder ownership causes market 
values to fall and high market values cause blockholders to sell out and reduce their shares.  
 
The negative effect of blockholder ownership on market value clearly may indicate that 
blockholders enjoy private benefits of control and that small shareholders therefore benefit 
when their grip on the company is loosened. Alternatively, a booming share market and the 
emergence of new financial instruments may have shifted the balance between risk and 
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incentives and have caused share prices to increase when blockholders reacted to the new 
situation.   
 
 
Non-linear effects 
 
Previous cross-sectional studies have indicated that the effects of blockholder ownership on 
market value might be non-linear: for example, positive for small levels of blockholder 
ownership because of increasing incentive alignment, but negative for high values of 
blockholder ownership because of increasing managerial entrenchment. In order to test this 
Hypothesis we split the sample in two according to the initial level of blockholder ownership 
(low blockholder ownership < 10 percent and high blockholder ownership ≥ 10 percent). We 
also tried a standard 5% threshold, and the results were similar. 
 
// Insert Table 4 about here // 
 
 Table 4 shows the results of the estimation shown for both sub-samples. Model I shows the 
direct Granger test (Equations 3 and 4) with the control variables and common slopes and 
intercepts for all firms. We find that the causal relationships become insignificant for firms 
with low initial levels of blockholder ownership, whereas they remain significant and are 
somewhat stronger for firms with high initial levels of blockholder ownership. For low initial 
levels of blockholder ownership, the effect of past firm value drops by a factor 10 from –0.07 
to -0.007, and the effect on firm value drops by a factor 3 from –0.006 to –0.002. The effects 
of the control variables remain qualitatively unchanged for low levels of blockholder 
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ownership, but for high levels sales increases have a negative impact on blockholder 
ownership (as predicted). The equity/assets ratio has a negative effect, which fails to support 
the Stultz (1988) model, but agrees with many previous studies reported by Holderness 
(2001). 
 
In Table 4, Model II shows the expanded model with random firm and time effects. As can be 
seen the qualitative results are very similar for the two models. Consequently, although the 
Hausman test in Model II indicates that the model with random firm and time effects fits the 
data, adding the random effects does not change the results qualitatively.  For high initial 
levels of blockholder ownership, the effect of past performance is found to be stronger  -
0.179 compared to –0.098 without fixed effects, but the performance effect is slightly 
weaker, and only significant at the 19% level. The control variables have the same effect as in 
Model I except that the (unexpected) negative association between capital structure and 
blockholder ownership now becomes insignificant. 
 
We find no significant effects of Q-values on ownership for low initial blockholder 
ownership, although the effect is significantly negative for high values of initial blockholder 
ownership. Hypothesis 2 cannot be rejected: the negative effects of blockholder ownership 
appear to apply only when the initial level is high. 
 
 
System differences 
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Another possible hypothesis is that the relationship between ownership and firm value might 
depend on system effects. For example, Hypothesis 3 proposes that increasing blockholder 
ownership will have a more positive effect on market values in common law countries where 
the risk of expropriation of minority investors by blockholders is checked by higher levels of 
legal protection.  An indirect effect of Hypothesis 2 might work in the same way. Since the 
average level of blockholder ownership is much lower in the US/UK, companies in these 
systems are less likely to experience negative managerial entrenchment effects when 
blockholder ownership increases.  
 
In order to test Hypothesis 3, the Granger tests are first run separately for the common law 
countries (US/UK) and civil law countries (continental European nations) (as shown in Table 
5, Models I and II).  
 
// Insert Table 5 around here// 
 
 
The estimates include random time and firm effects (Equations 5 and 6). In continental 
Europe, lagged values of Q are found to have no significant impact on blockholder 
ownership, whereas lagged blockholder ownership has a negative effect on valuation. In the 
US/UK neither the link from blockholder ownership to firm value nor the link from firm 
value to blockholder ownership is significant. In other words, Hypothesis 3 cannot be 
rejected since the effect of blockholder ownership on valuation is less negative or more 
positive in common law countries that are believed to offer better legal protection to minority 
investors.                                           
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 In order to establish whether this effect is attributable to high initial levels of ownership 
concentration, we break down both the civil law and common law samples by initial levels of 
ownership concentration (below or above the threshold of 10 percent blockholder ownership). 
Table 5, Model III shows the estimations for the sample with high initial blockholder 
ownership for both civil law and common law firms. We find that the negative effect of 
blockholder ownership effect in continental Europe is significant for high initial levels, while 
it is insignificant for low levels of initial blockholder ownership (not shown in the table). In 
other words, there is some evidence that the system effect is attributable to (or at least co-
varies with) a high level of blockholder ownership. Further analysis (Table 5, Model III) 
shows that the blockholder ownership effect on valuation is insignificant in the US/UK - also 
for initial high levels. In other words, the negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm 
value appears to be attributable to an interaction effect - the combined effect of high 
blockholder ownership in a continental European system. 
 
It appears that the high level of blockholder ownership in continental Europe is excessive 
seen from a firm value viewpoint. A plausible reason for the negative effect on firm value is 
that lower levels of investor protection in continental Europe imply larger private benefits of 
control for large blockholders than in the US/UK. When blockholder control is relaxed, the 
market therefore responds favourably. The private benefits might also explain why the large 
owners have not adjusted their shareholdings to maximize firm value.  
 
Some further, circumstantial support for Hypothesis 3 may be found by observing the time 
trends in blockholder ownership in continental Europe compared to the US/UK. If 
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blockholder ownership were negatively correlated with firm value in continental Europe, 
there would seem to be an incentive to reduce blockholder ownership over time. This is what 
Figure 1 shows. 
 
 
// Insert Figure 1 about here // 
 
After an increase at the end of the 1980s, blockholder ownership in Europe has declined 
steadily from 57 per cent in 1991 to 51 per cent in 1998. Over the same period, blockholder 
ownership in the US/UK increased steadily from 7 to 13 percent - where the effect of 
blockholder ownership was found to be slightly positive (although insignificant).  In other 
words, there is some evidence that the level of blockholder ownership actually adapts to 
market signals. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has contributed to the ongoing discussion on the causal link between ownership 
structure and firm value. 
 
The results may be summarised as follows: for high levels of blockholder ownership, further 
increases are found to have a negative effect on firm value. For low levels, the effect is 
insignificant.  Likewise, the effect is insignificant in common law countries (US/UK), where 
the legal protection of minority investors is said to be higher than in civil law countries 
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(continental Europe). In contrast, the effect is negative and highly significant for high initial 
levels of blockholder ownership and for companies based in continental Europe where the 
risk of blockholder expropriation of minority investors is presumably higher. Finally, we find 
evidence of a negative and significant feedback effect from firm value to blockholder 
ownership, perhaps because blockholders are more likely to sell out when they can get a 
higher price for their shares. 
 
Compared to previous studies of managerial ownership, the present study has relied on a 
broader concept of blockholder ownership, which includes managerial ownership and 
shareholdings controlled by management. Furthermore, this study has emphasised marginal 
change effects whereas level effects have presumably been neutralised by controlling for 
lagged values and adding random effects. For example, there may very well be positive 
effects of a high level of blockholder ownership while developments in the financial markets, 
monitoring technology, and other control factors have made it possible to increase 
shareholder value by marginally lowering that level. An assessment of the overall 
relationship between blockholder ownership and market value must involve both level and 
change effects. 
 
Taking the Demsetz (1983) critique into consideration, we propose that the observed negative 
effect of blockholder ownership may not be an equilibrium phenomenon, but rather a 
consequence of the restructuring of corporate governance and finance taking place in the 
largest European companies. Furthermore, hidden owner identity effects may be at work; 
many incumbent owners of the largest European companies - such as families, governments, 
banks or company groups - appear to have more complex objective functions than 
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maximising shareholder value (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). When these groups reduce 
their holdings relative to outsider portfolio investors, the markets may (correctly) infer 
greater emphasis on shareholder value. Moreover, incumbent blockholders may not want to 
adjust their holdings to maximise shareholder value if they also value the private benefits 
associated with ownership. 
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Table 1. List of Empirical Variables 
 
Code 
 
Description 
 
Definition 
 
Q 
 
Transformation of the sum of the market value 
of equity, and the book value of the total debt 
divided by the book value of assets 
 
Log [(Market price-year end * Common shares outstanding + book 
value of total debt) / book value of total assets]. 
 
LAGQ 
 
 
 
Lagged value of Q (one lag) 
 
ANGLO 
 
System. Headquarters based in an Anglo-
American common law system or in a 
continental-European civil law system 
 
Dummy=1 for common law countries (US, UK). 
             =0 for continental European civil law countries. (La Porta    
et al., 1999)               
 
OS 
 
Transformation of the fraction of closely held 
shares (chs).  Closely held shares are shares 
held by blockholders including officers, 
directors (and their families), trusts, 
pension/benefit plans, and shares held by 
another corporation or individuals that hold 
more than 5% 
 
Log [chs / (100-chs)] 
 
LAGOS 
 
 
 
Lagged value of OS (one lag) 
 
SALES 
CHANGE 
 
Changes in sales in timespan between measure 
of lagged values and present values 
 
(Present value of sales - lagged value of sales) / lagged value of 
sales 
SALES/ASSETS 
CHANGE 
 
Changes in sales/assets in timespan between 
measure of lagged values and present values 
 
Present value of sales/assets  - lagged value of sales/assets  
 
EQUITY/ ASSETS  
CHANGE 
 
Changes in equity/assets ratio in timespan 
between measure of lagged values and present 
values 
 
Present value of equity/assets  - lagged value of equity/assets 
 
Source: Worldscope-Disclosure (annually)
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 
 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1) Blockholder ownership   1.00 
 
2) One lag of blockholder ownership  0.92***   1.00 
 
3) Q-value -0.14*** -0.11***  1.00 
 
4) One lag of Q-value -0.13*** -0.10***  0.96***  1.00 
 
5) Sales changes  0.06***  0.06***  0.05***  0.08***  1.00 
 
6) Changes in sales/assets turnover -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.04***   0.15*** 1.00 
 
7) Changes in equity/assets ratio  0.03** 0.04***  0.02* -0.04*** -0.12*** -0.08*** 1.00 
 
 
 
Mean -2.77 -2.87 -0.25 -0.28  0.13 -0.01 -0.29 
Standard deviation  3.00  3.03  0.78  0.77  0.38  0.17  6.59 
 
 
 35 
Table 3.  Granger Causality Tests 
 
 Model I Model II (including controls) Model III Model IV (including controls) 
 
Dependent variable OS Q OS Q      OS Q      OS Q 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.237*** 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.231*** 
 
 0.009** 
 
-1.018*** 
 
-0.069*** 
 
-1.014*** 
 
-0.060** 
 
Q (t-1)  
 
-0.073*** 
 
 0.956*** 
 
-0.071*** 
 
 0.964*** 
 
-0.119*** 
 
 0.703*** 
 
-0.114*** 
 
 0.715*** 
 
OS (t-1) 
 
 0.913*** 
 
 
 
 0.913*** 
 
 
 
 0.625*** 
 
 
 
 0.625*** 
 
 
 
OS (t) 
 
 
 
-0.006*** 
 
 
 
-0.006*** 
 
 
 
-0.004** 
 
 
 
-0.004** 
Controls: 
- Changes in sales 
- Changes in assets  
- Changes in 
equity/assets 
    
-0.052 
-0.016 
-0.003 
 
-0.056*** 
 0.112*** 
 0.006*** 
  
 -0.028 
 -0.049 
 -0.002 
 
-0.014* 
 0.083*** 
 0.006*** 
 
   N (observations) 
   F-value 
 
  6430 
 18080*** 
 
 6766 
34709*** 
 
  6411 
  72123*** 
 
 6745 
14741*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   N (firm-years) 
   Hausman test 
  
    Variance components:  
- Firms 
- Time series 
- Error 
 
 
    
     6428 
     522*** 
    
 
      1.996 
      0.030 
      1.085 
 
   6764 
   530*** 
    
 
   0.104 
   0.005 
   0.040 
 
     6406 
     521*** 
    
 
      2.006 
      0.030 
      1.085 
 
   6740 
   528*** 
    
 
   0.100 
   0.005 
   0.038 
***, ** and * = significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively
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Table 4.  Granger Causality by Initial Level of Insider Ownership 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Initial level of insider 
ownership 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Dependent variable 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.733*** 
 
  0.041*** 
 
-0.136*** 
 
  0.006 
 
-1.729*** 
 
 0.011 
 
-0.337*** 
 
-0.083*** 
 
Q (t-1)  
 
-0.010 
 
  0.965*** 
 
-0.097*** 
 
  0.969*** 
 
-0.004  
 
0.757*** 
 
-0.183*** 
 
0.722*** 
 
OS (t-1) 
 
  0.845*** 
 
 
 
  0.837*** 
 
 
 
 0.645*** 
 
 
 
 0.581*** 
 
 
 
OS(t) 
 
 
 
 0.001 
 
 
 
-0.008*** 
 
 
 
0.001  
 
 
 
-0.006* 
Controls: 
- Changes in sales 
- Changes in asset 
turnover 
- Changes in 
equity/assets 
 
 0.123 
 0.055 
-0.004 
 
-0.065*** 
 0.175*** 
 0.003*** 
 
-0.083* 
-0.063 
-0.003 
 
-0.056*** 
 0.114*** 
 0.006*** 
 
  0.125 
  0.005 
 -0.004 
 
-0.041** 
 
0.160*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
 -0.074* 
 -0.045 
 -0.003 
 
-0.014 
 0.084*** 
 0.006*** 
 
   N (observations) 
   F-value  
 
   3165 
   1504*** 
 
  3270 
  8060*** 
 
   3006 
  1642*** 
 
  3214      
 6939*** 
    
 
   N (firm-years) 
   Hausman test 
  
    Variance components:  
- Firms 
- Time series 
- Error  
      3160 
 228*** 
 
 
 0.735 
 0.023 
 1.245 
 
 3265 
 219*** 
 
 
  0.070 
  0.006 
  0.030 
 
  3001 
  243*** 
 
 
  0.828 
  0.031 
  0.858 
 
  3209 
  253*** 
 
 
  0.108 
  0.004 
  0.042 
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Table 5.  Granger Causality Tests by System 
 
 
 
Model I 
 
Model II 
 
Model III 
High levels of initial insider ownership  
 
System 
 
Continental Europe 
 
US/UK 
 
Continental Europe 
 
US/UK 
 
Dependent variable 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
OS 
 
Q 
 
Intercept 
 
-0.083 
 
-0.162*** 
 
-1.421*** 
 
0.017 
 
 0.028 
 
-0.175*** 
 
- 0.701*** 
 
0.041 
 
Q (t-1)  
 
-0.063 
 
0.726*** 
 
 0.032 
 
0.711*** 
 
-0.037 
 
0.709*** 
 
-0.049 
 
0.742*** 
 
OS (t-1) 
 
0.622*** 
 
 
 
0.619*** 
 
 
 
 0.595*** 
 
 
 
 0.560***  
 
 
 
OS(t) 
 
 
 
-0.010** 
 
 
 
0.003  
 
 
 
- 0.015*** 
 
 
 
 0.002 
Controls: 
- Changes in sales 
- Changes in sales/assets  
- Changes in 
equity/assets 
 
-0.021 
-0.160 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.016 
 0.119*** 
 0.009*** 
 
-0.049 
-0.009 
 0.001 
 
-0.012 
 0.083*** 
 0.005*** 
 
-0.021 
-0.097 
-0.006* 
 
-0.014 
 0.107*** 
 0.009*** 
 
-0.170* 
 0.045 
-0.002 
 
-0.016 
 0.091*** 
 0.004*** 
 
N (firm-years) 
Hausman test 
  
Variance components:  
- Firms 
- Time series 
-     Error  
 
  1763 
  145*** 
 
 
   0.871 
   0.008 
   0.574 
 
 1954 
  163*** 
 
   
  0.086 
  0.007 
  0.037 
 
  4637 
  362*** 
 
   
  1.386 
  0.008 
  1.273 
 
 4780 
  350*** 
 
   
  0.089 
  0.006 
  0.037 
 
  1563 
  134*** 
 
    
   0.684 
   0.007 
   0.390 
 
  1730 
   142*** 
 
    
   0.093 
   0.007 
   0.038 
 
   1432 
   107*** 
 
   
   0.588 
   0.064 
   1.336 
 
   1473 
   103*** 
 
  
   0.078 
   0.005 
   0.044 
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Figure 1. Blockholder ownership
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